Surveillance-Evasion games are continuous path planning problems in which an evader chooses his trajectory to hinder the surveillance by an enemy observer. In the classical setting, both players are assumed to have full information about each other's actions, and seek an optimal response in real time. In contrast to that classical case, we discuss a game where both players have to plan under uncertainty as they are unable to observe each other's strategy. We consider two types of evader behavior: in the first one, a completely risk-averse evader seeks a trajectory minimizing his worst-case observability, and in the second one, the evader is concerned with the average-case observability. The latter version is naturally interpreted as a semi-infinite strategic game, and we provide an algorithm to compute an approximation to the resulting Nash equilibrium. The proposed approach draws on methods from game theory, convex optimization, optimal control, and multiobjective dynamic programming. We illustrate our algorithm using numerical examples and discuss the computational complexity, including for the generalized version with multiple evaders.
1. Introduction. Path planning is a problem of interest for many communities: traffic engineering, autonomous driving, robotics, and military. In the classical setting, the path planner is assumed to have full information about the environment and chooses a path minimizing some undesirable quantity; e.g., total time, distance, fuel consumption, or threat exposure. A particular type of continuous path planning problems is surveillance-evasion applications. In the simplest scenario, an evader (E) is choosing a path to minimize its exposure to an observer (O) whose surveillance plan is fixed and fully known to E in advance. This formulation is conveniently treated in the framework of optimal control theory, reviewed in section 2, with the evader's optimal policy recovered by solving a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) partial differential equation (PDE). However, the real focus of this paper is on adversarial planning, with O and E engaged in a strategic game to optimize the cumulative observability.
First surveillance-evasion problems have been explored by Joseph Lewin and collaborators in the 1970s [20] [21] [22] . In that classical setting, there was only one observerevader (O-E) pair, with E trying to escape the surveillance region as quickly as possible, while O tries to postpone (or prevent) this outcome. Both O and E were adjusting their dynamics in real-time, with full information about the capabilities and the current state of the opposing player. This competition is naturally modeled as a classical zero-sum differential game and can be fully resolved by solving nonlinear Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) PDEs [18] , yielding the optimal feedback control for both players (i.e., the plan of actions based on their current positions, velocities, etc). This approach is relatively expensive computationally, both because of a more complicated PDE for which it is harder to design fast numerical methods and because of the higher-dimensional state space (since one needs to keep track of observer's dynamics).
The setting we consider here is different in a fundamental way: we assume that players do not observe their opponent's current state and cannot adjust their strategy in real time. Instead, each player is forced to choose an adversarial plan in advance, trying to anticipate the opponent's actions. In this sense, ours is an open loop version of the game with a built-in uncertainty [3] . Moreover, we assume that O is restricted to choosing (either deterministically or stochastically) from a predefined set of surveillance plans known to both players. Compared to the classical setting, this assumption would appear to make the problem easier (since O's options are much more restricted), but also introduces unexpected complications. In zero-sum differential games, fairly mild technical assumptions guarantee that optimal feedback strategies are always deterministic/pure [2, 3] . But in our case, whether or not probabilistic/mixed strategies are needed depends on the optimization criteria used by both players.
For E's path planning, it is obviously important to consider the trade-offs in observability with respect to several different surveillance plans. This naturally brings us to the notion of Pareto optimality [23] and the numerical methods developed for multi-objective optimal control problems [19, 25] . As we show in section 3, the method introduced in [19] can be used to find the deterministic optimal policy for a completely risk-averse evader (i.e., minimizing the worst-case observability). Unfortunately, the computational cost of this approach grows exponentially with the number of surveillance plans available to O. But if the goal for both players is to optimize the averagecase/expected observability, we show that this can be accomplished by adopting a much more computationally affordable method from [25] , despite its significant drawbacks for general multi-objective control problems. Moreover, we show that, if the evader's average-case optimal strategy is deterministic, then that same strategy is also worst-case optimal.
For the rest of the paper, we concentrate on the average-case observability formulation using the theory of semi-infinite zero-sum games [34] . In classical (finite zero-sum two-player) strategic games, the Nash equilibrium is typically obtained using linear programming [26] . But the fact that E's set of pure strategies is uncountably infinite makes this approach unusable in our context. Instead, we show how to compute the Nash equilibrium in section 4 by combining convex optimization with fast numerical methods for HJB equations. The computational cost of the resulting method scales at most linearly with the number of surveillance plans. We illustrate this approach on a large number of examples, with the details of our numerical implementation covered in section 5.
Our modeling approach is quite general, but to simplify the exposition we will assume that the evader is moving in a two-dimensional domain with occluding/impenetrable obstacles, both the observability and E's speed are isotropic (i.e., independent of E's chosen direction of motion), and all O's surveillance plans are stationary (i.e., the observer is choosing among possible stationary locations). This further simplifies the PDE aspect of our problem from the general HJB to stationary Eikonal equations, the efficient numerical methods for which are particularly well-developed in the last 25 years (e.g., [30] ).
In section 6, we generalize the problem by considering multiple evaders. We first treat this as a two-player game between a single observer and a centralized controller of all evaders. But we also show that the resulting set of strategies is also a Nash equilibrium from the point of view of individual/selfish evaders. We conclude by discussing further extensions and limitations of our approach in section 7.
Continuous Path
Planning. The case where the observer's strategy is fixed and known can be easily handled by methods of classical optimal control theory. The goal is to guide an evader (E) from its starting position x S to its desired target x T while minimizing the "cumulative observability" along the way through the state space Ω ⊂ R d . More precisely, we will suppose that A is a compact set of control values, and A is the set of E's admissible controls which are measurable functions a : R → A. The evader's dynamics are defined by y (t) = f (y(t), a(t)), with the initial state y(0) = x S ∈Ω. In all of our numerical examples, we will assume that E's state is simply its position, f is its velocity,Ω is a known map with (impenetrable, occluding) obstacles and E is allowed to travel along ∂Ω (including the obstacle boundaries). Suppose T a = min{t ≥ 0 | y(t) = x T } is the travel-time-through-Ω associated with this control. A pointwise observability function K :Ω × A → R is then defined to reflect O's surveillance capabilities for different parts of the domain, taking into account all obstacles/occluders and E's current position and direction. The cumulative observability is then defined by integrating K along a trajectory corresponding to a(·)
which we will also denote as J (a(·)) when x is clear from the context. As usual in dynamic programming, the value function is then defined as by minimizing the cumulative observability; i.e., u(x) = inf a(·) J (x, a(·)). Under suitable "small-time controllability" assumptions [2] , it is easy to show that u is locally Lipschitz onΩ. If it is also smooth, a Taylor series expansion can be used to show that u satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE:
Moreover, characteristics of this nonlinear PDE are precisely the optimal trajectories. Unfortunately, the value function u is generically non-smooth, and there usually are starting positions with multiple optimal trajectories -these are the locations where the characteristics cross and ∇u is undefined. Thus, a classical solution to (2.2) usually does not exist. The theory of viscosity solutions introduced by Crandall and Lions [11] overcomes this difficulty by selecting the unique weak solution coinciding with the value function of the above control problem.
In this paper we consider isotropic problems, where the observability K and speed of motion f depend only on x. In that case, we choose A = {a ∈ R d | |a| = 1} and interpret a as the direction of motion. Then K(x, a) = K(x) and f (x, a) = f (x)a, with f encoding the speed of motion through the point x. In this case, the optimal direction is known analytically: a * = −∇u/|∇u| and (2.2) reduces to an Eikonal equation
Since this PDE is of the first order, its characteristics define the direction of information flow. This is quite useful once the PDE is discretized on a grid, yielding a large coupled system of nonlinear equations. Knowing the characteristic direction for every gridpoint, one could, in principle, re-order the equations, effectively decoupling the system. But since this PDE is nonlinear, the characteristic directions are not known in advance. One path 1 to computational efficiency is to determine those characteristic directions simultaneously with solving the discretized system, in the spirit of Dijkstra's classical algorithm for finding shortest paths on graphs [14] . Two such non-iterative methods (Tsitsiklis' Algorithm [36] and Sethian's Fast Marching Method [29] ) are applicable to the special isotropic case (2.3). Once (2.3) is solved, the optimal trajectory may be recovered by finding the path orthogonal to the level curves of u(x). This can be achieved numerically by a steepest descent method on u(x). An example of the solution of (2.3) is shown in 1. 3) for f (x) = 1 and the cost function in (a). The red diamond is the starting position, the red circle is the target position, and the green curve is the optimal trajectory, which is orthogonal to the level curves of u(x) and follows a part of the obstacle boundary. See section 5 for additional information and parameters used.
Multiple observer locations and different notions of optimality.
We now transition to the setting where the observer has a choice of multiple surveillance plans. Assuming that the observer remains stationary, this is equivalent to choosing its position from a fixed set of r locations X = {x 1 , · · · ,x r } known to the evader. Each location is associated with a pointwise observability function K i (x) for an evader moving through x ∈Ω and an observer stationed atx i . (Typically, K i is a decreasing function of |x −x i | when x is visible fromx i or a small constant σ > 0 if x is in a "shadow zone"; see section 5 for further details.) This results in r different definitions of the cumulative observability J = [J 1 , . . . , J r ] T for a particular control. Ideally, a rational evader would prefer a path that minimizes its exposure to all possible observer locationsx i . Unfortunately, there usually does not exist a single control minimizing all J i 's simultaneously. This naturally leads us to a notion of Pareto tions. We refer readers to [7, 8] for a review of many other "fast" techniques, including the hybrid marching/sweeping methods that aim to combine the best features of both approaches. Even though our own implementation is based on Fast Marching, any of these methods can be used to solve isotropic control problems arising in subsequent sections. Which one will be faster depends on the domain geometry and the particular pointwise observability functions. optimal trajectories and the methods for computing them efficiently. We review two such methods 2 in subsection 3.1 and explain how they can be used for planning by an evader optimizing either the worst-case or average-case observability in 3.2.
3.1. Multiobjective path planning. For a fixed starting position x ∈ Ω, a control a(·) is dominated by a controlâ(·) if J i (x,â(·)) ≤ J i (x, a(·)) for all i and the inequality is strict for at least one of them. We call a(·) Pareto optimal if it is not dominated by any other control. In other words, Pareto optimal controls are the ones that cannot be improved with respect to any one criterion without making them worse with respect to another. The vector of costs associated with each Pareto optimal control defines a point in R r and the set of all such points is the Pareto Front (PF). In path planning applications, the PF is typically used to carefully evaluate all tradeoffs. (E.g., what is the smallest attainable J 1 given the desired upper bounds on J 2 , . . . , J r ?)
Mitchell and Sastry developed a method for multiobjective path planning [25] based on the usual scalarization approach to multiobjective optimization [23] . Let
is then solved for a fixed λ, providing a control function a λ (·) satisfying a λ (·) ∈ arg min a(·)∈A J λ (x S , a(·)). We call such a control function λ-optimal. If λ i > 0 for all i, the obtained λ-optimal control is also guaranteed to be Pareto optimal; see Figure 2 . However, if at least one λ i = 0 and multiple λ-optimal strategies exist for a specific λ, then some of the λ-optimal strategies may not be Pareto optimal. Such corner cases (illustrated in Figure 5 ) might require additional pruning; alternatively, one can rule out such non-Pareto trajectories by perturbing λ to ensure that all components are positive. Additional linear PDEs can be solved simultaneously to compute the individual costs (J 1 , . . . J r ) incurred along this λ-optimal trajectory; e.g., when f and all K i 's are isotropic, the corresponding linear equations are
where v λ i (x) = J i x, a λ (·) . To approximate the PF, this procedure is repeated for a large number of λ ∈ ∆ r . Unfortunately, as shown in Figure 2 , scalarization-based methods can only recover the convex portion of PF [12] . This is an important drawback since in many optimal control problems the non-convex parts of PF are very common and equally important. An alternative approach was developed in [19] to address this limitation and produce the entire PF for all x ∈Ω simultaneously. The method is applicable for any number of observer positions, but to simplify the notation we explain it here for r = 2 only. We expand the state space to Ω e = Ω × [0, B] and define the new value function w(x, b) = inf J 1 (x, a(·)), with the infimum taken over all controls satisfying J 2 (x, a(·)) ≤ b. 
The line perpendicular to λ is tangent to PF at Q. If any part of PF fell below it, the path corresponding to Q would not be λ-optimal. The dotted line is the central ray (where J 1 = J 2 )). (b) Non-convex smooth Pareto Front. Points P and R correspond to 2 different λ-optimal paths. The portion of PF between P and R (including the worst-case optimal point Q) cannot be found by scalarization. Point S, found as a convex combination of P and R, is averagecase optimal.
Thus, b is naturally interpreted as the current "budget" for the secondary criterion. The value function is then recovered by solving an augmented PDE
The method in [19] uses a first-order accurate semi-Lagrangian discretization [15] to compute the discontinuous viscosity solution of (3.3) for a range of problems in multicriterion path planning. The method was later generalized to treat constraints on reset-renewable resources [33] . The same approach was also adapted to Probabilistic RoadMap graphs and field-tested on robotic platforms at the United Technologies Research Center [10] . Aside from approximating the entire PF, the key computational advantage is the explicit causality: since K 2 is positive, all characteristics are monotone in b and methods similar to the explicit "forward marching" in b-direction are applicable. (I.e., the system of discretized equations is trivially de-coupled.) Of course, the main drawback of the above idea is the higher dimensionality of Ω e . For r observer locations, the scalarization approach [25] requires solving (r + 1) PDEs on Ω ⊂ R d , but the parameter space Λ r is (r − 1)-dimensional. In contrast, with w(x, b) there are no parameters, but the computational domain is (d + r − 1)-dimensional. Several techniques for restricting the computations to a relevant part of Ω e were developed in [19] , but the computational cost and memory requirements are still significantly higher than for any (single) HJB-solve in Ω.
Different notions of adversarial optimality. The Pareto Front allows us
to answer one version of the surveillance-evasion problem: if the evader is completely risk-averse, he may chose the worst-case optimal strategy. That is, E will pick a control a W (·) that minimizes the observability from its "worst" observer positionx i :
This corresponds to the version of the problem where E is forced to "go first", with O selecting the maximizingx i ∈ X in response. The following result shows that the intersection of Pareto Front with the "central ray" (i.e., the line where J 1 = J 2 · · · = J r ) yields the worst-case optimal strategy for E:
is a Pareto-optimal control satisfying J i (a λ = (·)) = J j (a = (·)) for all i, j ∈ {1, · · · r}, then a = (·) is also worst-case optimal.
Proof. Suppose there exists a (·) s.t.
then for all j we have:
which contradicts the Pareto-optimality of a = (·). The trajectory in yellow is worst-case optimal for the evader as it is equally observable from both locations. (c) The convex part of Pareto Front (computed using the scalarization approach) intersects the "central ray" (J 1 = J 2 , shown in red). The worst-case optimal vector λ * is orthogonal to PF at the point of intersection (in yellow), whose coordinates correspond to the partial costs of the optimal path. The probability distribution λ * , together with the yellow trajectory form a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game between the evader and the observer described in section 4. See section 5 for additional information and parameters used.
The corresponding vector of costs J (a = (·)) may lie on the convex portion of PF, as in Figures 2(A) and 3, in which case a W = a = can be found by scalarization [25] . But if J (a = (·)) lies on the non-convex portion of PF, as in Figures 2(B) and 4, the computational cost of finding the evader's worst-case optimal strategy grows exponentially with r as it involves solving a non-linear differential equation in (r+d−1) dimensions [19] . The scenario where the central ray does not intersect the convex part of PF is particularly common on domains with obstacles; e.g., see Figure 6 .
Luckily, another interpretation of evader's objectives proves much more computationally tractable. Even though a = (·) yields the lowest worst-case observability that . The two best response trajectories used when O choosesx 1 orx 2 are shown in blue and pink respectively. The trajectory in yellow and green are not worst-case optimal for the evader. The worst-case optimal trajectory is plotted in gray. (c) The convex part of the Pareto Front (in cyan) computed using the scalarization approach, and the whole Pareto Front (in black) computed using the method in [19] . The convex part of the Pareto Front does not intersect the central ray (shown in red). The worst-case optimal strategy (in gray) lies on the non-convex part of the Pareto Front and thus cannot be computed using a scalarization approach. The Nash equilibrium pair of strategies consists of using positionsx 1 andx 2 with probabilities λ * for O, and using the yellow and green trajectories E can achieve if he must choose a single control function deterministically, E might be able to attain an even lower expected (or average-case) observability if he switches to "mixed policies", choosing a probability distribution over a set of Pareto optimal controls. This is illustrated in Figure 2 (B): by choosing probabilistically a path corresponding to the point P and another corresponding to point R, E obtains a new point S on the central ray, whose expected observability is lower than for the worst-case optimal Q regardless of O's selected location. Of course, for any single run from x S to x T , the worst-case observability of this probabilistic policy is based on the worst cases for P and R, which (from the point of view of a completely risk-averse evader) would make S inferior to the worst-case optimal Q. This scenario is fully realized in Figure 4 , where J 1 (a = (·)) = J 2 (a = (·)) ≈ 4.94, the expected observability corresponding to the optimal "probabilistic mix" of yellow and green trajectories is ≈ 4.83, but the worst case associated with this mixed policy is J 1 (yellow) ≈ 6.03. We note that O could also consider using a mixed strategy. In this case K λ can be interpreted as the expected pointwise observability when using the probability density λ ∈ ∆ r over the positions X . Similarly J λ (a(·)) is the expected cumulative observability when using the control function a(·). Figure 2 shows that when we are interested in the average-case optimal behavior for both O and E, we only need to consider a convex hull of PF (denoted co(PF)), and the scalarization is thus adequate. Note that in Figures 3, 4 , and 6, co(PF) was approximated by imposing a fine grid on ∆ r and re-solving (2.3) for each sampled λ. Since we only care about the intersection of co(PF) with the central ray, this procedure is wasteful and prohibitively expensive, particularly for high r. In the next section, we consider the case where both E and O optimize the expected/average-case performance by reformulating this as a semi-infinite strategic game. We show that it can be solved through scalarization combined with convex optimization, without approximating the (convex hull of the) entire Pareto Front.
Remark 3.2. Up till now, our geometric interpretation in Figures 3, 4 , and 6 assumed that the convex hull of the Pareto Front intersects the central ray. If this is not the case, O will avoid using some of his positions. E.g., Figure 5 shows the pink and yellow trajectories corresponding to a 1 (·) and a 2 (·), which are optimal with respect to observer positionsx 1 andx 2 . Since J 1 (a 2 (·)) ≤ J 2 (a 2 (·)), the E's worstcase for a 2 (·) is actually the observer locationx 2 . A generalization of this scenario for r > 2 is covered in Theorem 4.2. The pink trajectory is the best response when the observer uses positionx 1 . (c) The Pareto Front does not intersect the central ray. The worst-case optimal trajectory is the one point on the Pareto Front that is closest to the central ray: the yellow point. The blue point is λ * -optimal but it is not Pareto optimal as it is dominated by the yellow point. The Nash equilibrium strategy consists of the positionx 2 for O, and the yellow trajectory for E (see section 4). See section 5 for additional information and parameters used.
4.
A strategic game formulation. In this section, we cast the surveillanceevasion into a strategic game framework, and look for optimal strategies for each player. We assume that the evader is attempting to minimize (while the observer is attempting to maximize) the total expected observability integrated over E's trajectories and dependent on O's positions. We further assume that O is aware of E's initial location x S and its target location x T but not of the trajectories chosen by E. Similarly, E is aware of the predefined locations of O, but not of the realized positions chosen by O. This game may be stated deterministically or stochastically. In the deterministic case, each player chooses a single pure strategy. That is, the observer chooses a single locationx i ∈ X and the evader chooses a single control function a(·) ∈ A. In the probabilistic setting, each player chooses a mixed strategy, i.e., a probability distribution over the pure strategies. In other words, O chooses a probability distribution λ ∈ ∆ r over positions and E chooses a probability distribution θ ∈ ∆ A over control functions. The payoff function of the game is the cumulative expected observability, and can be expressed as P (λ, θ) = E θ J λ (a(·)) where E θ [·] denotes the expectation over the mixed strategy θ.
This game is a two player zero-sum game [26] , as each player's gains or losses are exactly balanced by the losses or gains of the opponent. Furthermore, it is semiinfinite as the set of pure strategies for O is a finite number r, whereas the set of pure strategies for E is uncountably infinite. A central notion of solution for strategic games is a Nash equilibrium [26] , a pair of strategies for which neither player can improve his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. That is, a pair of strategies (λ * , θ * ) is a Nash equilibrium if both of the following conditions hold:
(4.1)
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not always exist, therefore we focus on finding a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In our setting, the minimax theorem for semi-infinite games [28] assures that a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (λ * , θ * ) exists, that all Nash equilibria have the same payoff, and that they are attained at the minimax (which is also equal to the maximin):
Although θ is a probability distribution over the uncountable set ∆ A , there always exists an optimal mixed strategy θ * which is a mixture of at most r pure strategies, where r is the maximum number of positions for the observer [28] . In fact, it is easy to show that there will always exist a Nash equilibrium (λ * , θ * ) with the number of pure strategies used in θ * not exceeding the number of non-zero components in λ * .
In the case of finite two-player zero-sum games, computing the Nash equilibrium is easily achieved by linear programming. In our setting, the challenge in computing a Nash equilibrium arises from enumerating the control functions a(·) ∈ A which are part of E's mixed strategy. Indeed, we do not possess a useful parametrization of the set of control functions A, and our only computational kernel to generate a single λoptimal control function a λ (·) is to solve the weighted-cost Eikonal equation in (3.1). For that reason, our solution strategy to compute the Nash Equilibrium involves two steps:
1. Find an approximate optimal strategy of the observer λ * using convex optimization (see subsection 4.1). 2. Find an approximate optimal strategy of the evader θ * by generating nearoptimal control functions (see subsection 4.2).
4.1.
Optimal strategy of the Observer. In order to compute an optimal strategy λ * of the observer, we consider the following problem:
For any fixed strategy λ for O, the inner minimization represents the optimal response of player E to that fixed strategy. Therefore, the maximin problem answers the question: what is the optimal strategy for O given that E gets to observe that strategy and respond? We call this problem the E-response problem. Note that although E could use a mixed strategy, there always exists a pure strategy which is optimal, that is: min
4)
This implies that any optimal λ for (4.3) is also an optimal λ for (4.2). Consequently, the optimal λ for (4.3) is one half of a Nash equilibrium pair. However, the optimal pair (λ, a(·)) of (4.3) is not a Nash equilibrium, except in a specific situation described in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose there exists λ = ∈ ∆ r with associated λ = -optimal control function a λ = (·) which satisfies J i (a λ = (·)) = J j (a λ = (·)) for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, then (λ = , a λ = (·)) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The fact that E cannot improve his payoff follows from the definition of a λ = ∈ arg min a(·) J λ = (a(·)). O may not improve his payoff either as for all λ,
This situation corresponds to the case when the convex part of the Pareto Front intersects the central ray, such as in the example in Figure 3 . Theorem 3.1 implies that in this case, the worst-case optimal strategy for E coincides with E's half of the Nash equilibrium. Note that in general such a λ = does not have to exist; e.g., in Figure 4 and Figure 6 the convex part of the Pareto Front does not intersect the central ray. In such situations, the worst-case optimal strategy for E and the Nash Equilibrium are different. Moreover, the latter involves a mixed strategy for E covered in subsection 4.2.
We now direct our attention to solving the E-response problem numerically. Equation (4.3) may be stated as the following optimization problem:
The objective function G(λ) = min a(·)A r i=1 λ i J i (a(·)) is concave as it is the pointwise minimum of linear functions. Furthermore, the vector of individual cumulative costs J (a λ (·)), where a λ (·) ∈ arg min a(·)∈A J λ (a(·)), is a supergradient of G (denoted as J (a λ (·)) ∈ ∂G(λ)). A supergradient provides an ascent direction of a concave function, i.e., w ∈ ∂G(λ) if for allλ ∈ ∆ r ,
The fact that J (a λ (·)) ∈ ∂G(λ) is seen from the following computation: for anyλ,
Evaluating the vector J (a λ (·)) can be challenging computationally; we show how this can be done in subsection 5.2. Once this ascent direction is known, one still needs to ensure that λ remains a feasible probability distribution over X , and we use the orthogonal projection operator Π : R r → ∆ r . The operator Π can be computed in O(r log r) operations [5, 37] as summarized in Algorithm 4.1. The resulting projected supergradient method [4, Chap. 8 ] is shown in Algorithm 4.2. The iterates of Algorithm 4.2 for the example from Figure 6 are illustrated in Figure 7 . Compute G(λ k ) = u λ k (x S ) and find some g ∈ ∂G(λ k )
4:
λ k+1 ← Π (λ k + α k g) 5: end for 6: return arg max λ∈{λ 0 ,...,λ n } G(λ) 4.2. Optimal strategy of the Evader. Computing the evader's half of the Nash equilibrium is more challenging due to the fact that the set of E's pure strategies, i.e., the set of control functions a(·) leading from the source x S to the target x T , is uncountably infinite. We propose a heuristic strategy to approximate θ * which relies on two properties of the Nash equilibrium in semi-infinite games:
1. There exists a Nash mixed strategy for E which uses only r pure strategies 3 [28] . 2. All pure strategies employed with positive probability in the Nash equilibrium have the same expected payoff, with the expectation taken over the other half of the Nash. In particular, all control functions used with positive probability in the Nash equilibrium are λ * -optimal. The following characterization of the Nash equilibrium helps us generate a good candidate set of λ * -optimal trajectories. 
Proof. ( ⇒)
3 This result assumes that the set S = {(s 1 , s 2 , . . . s r ) | s i = P (x i , a(·)); i = 1, 2, . . . , r; a(·) ∈ A} ⊂ R r is bounded and co(S) is closed. In our case, S is not bounded for the full set of control functions in A but becomes bounded if we restrict our attention to Pareto optimal control functions. . The two best response trajectories used when O choosesx 1 orx 2 are shown in blue and pink respectively. The trajectories in yellow and green are not worst-case optimal for the evader but are used in E's mixed Nash equilibrium strategy. (c) The convex part of the Pareto Front does not intersect the central ray (shown in red). This is the same situation already observed in Figure 4 , but it is even more common on domains with obstacles. The Nash equilibrium pair of strategies consists of using positionŝ x 1 andx 2 with probabilities λ * for O, and using the yellow and green trajectories with probability Figure 6 . (b) The λ k -optimal trajectories of the first 6 iterates. We note that only a few iterates are needed to obtain trajectories which are close to the central ray. Thus, it does not require computing the whole PF which saves computational time.
Suppose (λ * , θ * ) is a Nash equilibrium. Item 1 follows from the minimax theorem for semi-infinite game and (4.4). Assume Item 2 does not hold, then there must exist i, j ∈ I s.t. E θ * [J i (a(·))] > E θ * J j (a(·)) . Consider the strategyλ ∈ ∆ r :
Then we have that:
This contradicts that (λ * , θ * ) is a Nash equilibrium, thus Item 2 must hold. A similar argument can be used to demonstrate Item 3: assume there exists i ∈ I with E θ * [J i (a(·))] > G(λ * ). Let j ∈ I and consider the strategyλ:
Once again, this implies that P (λ * , θ * ) < P (λ, θ * ) which contradicts that (λ * , θ * ) is a Nash equilibrium.
(⇐) Assume Items 1 to 3 hold and suppose there exists θ s.t. P (λ * , θ) < P (λ * , θ * ), then there must exist a(·), used with non-zero probability in θ such that:
This contradicts the definition of G(λ * ) = arg min a(·)∈A J λ * (a(·)). Thus, for all θ ∈ ∆ A we have that: P (λ * , θ * ) ≤ P (λ * , θ) . (4.6)
From Items 2 and 3 it follows that for all λ ∈ ∆ r :
Equations (4.6) and (4.7) imply that (λ * , θ * ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Any mix of λ * -optimal trajectories forms a λ * -optimal strategy for the evader. However, that mix is part of a Nash equilibrium only if the observer has no incentive to change his strategy in response. Theorem 4.2 says that this is the case when the θ * defining the mix of individual observability of λ * -optimal trajectories lies on the central ray of the Pareto Front for a reduced problem. I.e., the PF for the O-E game where the observer has a potentially smaller number of positions (the ones which are used with positive probability in λ * ). This PF is in an s dimensional criterion space, where s = |I| ≤ r. In Figure 3 , the number of observer positions is r = 2, and the dimension of the "reduced" problem is also s = 2 since both positions are used with positive probability. In this example, a single λ * -optimal trajectory exists and corresponds to the intersection of the central ray and the convex part of the PF. In the examples from Figure 4 and Figure 6 , we still have r = 2 and s = 2, however there are two λ * -optimal trajectories. The Nash mixed strategy for E is thus obtained by finding a probability distribution (ω 1 , ω 2 ) ∈ ∆ 2 over these two trajectories (a 1 (·), a 2 (·)) such that the linear combination of their individual costs lies on the central ray, i.e., such that ω 1 J 1 (a 1 (·)) + ω 2 J 1 (a 2 (·)) = ω 1 J 2 (a 1 (·)) + ω 2 J 2 (a 2 (·)). In the example from Figure 5 , r = 2 and s = 1. The PF of the reduced problem is a single point, and thus trivially lies on the "central ray", yielding a pure Nash equilibrium strategy for E. In section 5, we show additional examples with r = 3, s = 3, and r = 6, s = 4. Computationally, Theorem 4.2 means that if we are able to find a set of g λ * -optimal control functions A(λ * ) = {a j (·)} j=g j=1 , such that Items 2 and 3 hold for some probability distribution ω ∈ ∆ g , then λ * is O's optimal response to ω and we have found a Nash equilibrium pair. Note that the minimum number of trajectories g needed to form a Nash equilibrium is bounded above by s.
One remaining task is finding such a set A(λ * ). Multiple λ * -optimal controls only exist if x S lies on a shockline of u λ * , where the gradient is undefined (e.g., the lim x i →x S ∇u(x i ) can be different depending on the sequence {x i } i ). Numerically, our approximation of u λ * will yield a single upwind approximation of ∇u λ * , yielding a single λ * -optimal trajectory. As we show in Figure 8 , multiple optimal trajectories might lie in the same upwind quadrant and any numerical implementation of gradient descent will find only one of them. (In theory, one can approximate the other by perturbing x S , but the direction of perturbation is unobvious, particularly when x S lies on an intersection of multiple shocklines, which is surprisingly common in this application; see Figure 9 . Moreover, in some degenerate maze examples two λ * -optimal trajectories might initially coincide near x S reducing the usefulness of this perturbation strategy; see the pink and yellow trajectories in Figure 10 .) This challenge is even more pronounced because 4.2 yields an approximate value of λ * , since x S will now be only near a shockline for some perturbed λ * δ = λ * + δλ. The resulting single λ * δ -optimal control will be a reasonable approximate solution for the max-min problem, but can be arbitrarily far from the solution to a min-max problem (where O has a chance to switch to another strategy).
In view of these challenges, we opt for a different approach, where an approximation to A(λ * ) is computed iteratively, by adaptively growing a collection of λ * δ -optimal controls corresponding to different δλ's. In some degenerate cases, generating even the first a 1 (·) ∈ A(λ * ) may not be trivial since some λ * -optimal control computed by solving the Eikonal will not be necessarily Pareto-optimal. E.g., in Figure 5 two control functions are λ * -optimal, but only one of them is used in the Nash strategy of E as the blue trajectory violates Item 3. However, both trajectories are indistinguishable from the point of view of the Eikonal solver since the positionx 1 has zero weight in the weighted observability function K λ * . To address this issue whenever s < r, we set the weight of the pointwise observability of each unused position i ∈ I to some small value (our implementation uses = 10 −6 ). This is equivalent to seeking the solution of the weighted cost Eikonal equation for some perturbed λ * δ = (1 − )λ * + r−s I I c , where I I c is the characteristic function of the complement of I. We now turn our attention to finding further perturbations needed to generate λ * δ -optimal trajectories in order to make Item 2 approximately hold. Our goal is to have g j=1 ω j J i (a j (·)) = G(λ * ) (4.8) approximately hold for all i ∈ I = {i | λ * i > 0}. Unless this is already true with g = 1 (based on the previously found a 1 (·)), we will need to find more λ * δ -optimal controls. Without loss of generality assume that I = {1, . . . , s}, and suppose we have already generated a set of k λ * δ -optimal trajectories A k = {a 1 (·), a 2 (·), . . . , a k (·)}, for some k < g . In order for (4.8) to approximately hold, we will be increasing k until the norm of residual a 2 (·) ) . . . J 1 (a k (·)) J 2 (a 1 (·)) J 2 (a 2 (·)) . . . J 2 (a k (·)) . . . . . . . . . . . .
falls under a threshold tol R . Assuming the set of trajectories A k has already been computed, the probability distribution ω k ∈ ∆ k minimizing the norm of this residual R(ω k ) 2 can be found by quadratic programming. The residual vector R(ω k ) provides information about which control functions are missing. For example, consider the case where we observe that a single entry of R(ω k ) is large and positive, i.e., that for some i ∈ I:
The characterization in Theorem 4.2 implies that A(λ * ) should include at least one trajectory much more observable from positionx i . A λ * δ -optimal trajectory with that property can be found by perturbing λ to slightly decrease the role ofx i in O's chosen strategy. This is equivalent to re-solving the Eikonal with K λ * δ corresponding to λ * δ = Π I λ * − δe i where δ << 1 is chosen adaptively (see Algorithm 5.1), e i is the i-th standard basis vector, and Π I is the orthogonal projection onto the simplex defined only with elements of I. Once a new λ * δ -optimal control function has been found, we may solve the quadratic program in (4.9) again with an additional column, and repeat the process until the norm of the residual is sufficiently small. More generally, a large R(ω) implies that some control functions in A(λ * ) (or some mix of control functions) not in the current set A k has a high observability with respect to the positive entries of R(ω) while having a low observability with respect to the negative entries of R(ω). Thus, we set the perturbation direction to −R(ω) instead of −e i . Throughout this perturbation step, the entries of λ * associated with the complement I are held fixed. Our full method for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium is summarized in Algorithm 4.3.
This method also has a geometric interpretation in terms of the Pareto Front. Whenever θ * is not a pure strategy, a hyperplane normal to λ * supports PF at multiple points (corresponding to all controls in A(λ * )). However, any generic perturbation of λ * would result in a hyperplane supporting PF near only one of these points, and the approximation to λ * found by Algorithm 4.2, will correspond to a single optimal trajectory. For example, if we start with a 1 (·) corresponding to the yellow point in Figure 6c (and associated yellow trajectory in Figure 6b ), then a small tilt (decreasing the role of positionx 1 in O's plan) will yield a hyperplane supporting PF near the green point, allowing us to approximate the green trajectory in Figure 6b by solving the weighted cost Eikonal equation with observability function K λ * δ .
Numerical matters.
In this section, we detail the implementation of our algorithm and present additional numerical results. All algorithms were implemented 
Find λ * δ -optimal control a 1 (·) and compute J i (a 1 (·)) for all i ∈ I 5: k ← 1,
Find λ * δ -optimal control a k+1 (·) and compute J i (a k+1 (·)) for all i ∈ I
9:
A k+1 ← A k ∪ {a k (·)} 10:
11:
k ← k + 1 12: end while 13: return λ * , A k , ω k in C++ and compiled with icpc version 16.0 on a MacBook Pro (16 GB RAM and an Intel Core i7 processor with four 2.5 GHz cores). The code is available online at https://github.com/eikonal-equation/Stationary SEG. Our implementation relies on data structures and methods from Boost, Eigen and QuadProg++ libraries. The pointwise observability functions are defined as
We set σ = 0.1 andK(r) = (ρr 2 +0.1) −1 with ρ = 1 in all examples except in Figure 5 (where we set ρ = 30 simply to improve the visualization). The visibility of each gridpoint with respect to each observer position is precomputed and stored, but the K i values are computed on the fly as needed.
The shadow zones for each observer are precomputed as follows. For each observer locationx i , two distance functions are computed: D i 0 (x) and D i (x). The first is the distance betweenx i and x when the obstacles are absent, while the second is that distance when obstacles are present. These distance functions can be computed by imposing the boundary conditions D i 0 (x i ) = D i (x i ) = 0 and then solving two Eikonal equations [30] :
with Obs(x) set to ∞ inside the obstacles and 1 otherwise. The shadow zone ofx i is characterized by D i > D i 0 . But due to numerical errors in their approximation, we use a threshold value τ = 10 −3 h (where h is the grid spacing) and specify that x is in this shadow zone whenever D i (x) > D i 0 (x) + τ.
The perturbation stepsize δ in Algorithm 4.3 is chosen adaptively using Algorithm 5.1. The goal of the adaptive strategy is to find the smallest perturbation δ necessary to obtain an additional λ * δ -optimal control function a k+1 (·).
Algorithm 5.1 Adaptive strategy for choosing δ to generate a k+1 (·)
Compute a λ * δ -optimal control functionâ(·) 4: while J (â(·)) − J (a j (·)) 2 < tol δ for any j ∈ {1, . . . k} do 5:
Compute λ * δ -optimal control functionâ(·) 8: end while 9: a k+1 (·) ←â(·)
The initialization used in our implementation is δ 0 = 10 −4 , and the tolerance is set to tol δ = 10 −2 J (â(·)) 2 . The stepsize rule used in the supergradient iteration in Algorithm 4.2 is α k = 1 (k J (a λ 0 (·)) ), the initial guess λ 0 is a uniform distribution on A and the tolerance criteria on the residual and the near 0 entries used in Algorithm 4.3 are tol R = 10 −3 G(λ * ) and tol λ = 5 · 10 −3 respectively. The quadratic programming problem in (4.9) is solved using the library QuadProg++.
Computation of individual costs.
Running algorithm Algorithm 4.2 requires computing the vector of individual observability J (x S , a λ (·)). This problem is exactly the one solved by the scalarization approach described in subsection 3.1. Therefore, it can in principle be done by solving the Eikonal equation in (2.3) with cost function K λ and associated linear equations in (3.2); i.e.: G(λ) = u λ (x S ) and J i (x S , a λ (·)) = v λ i (x S ). However, this technique has a severe drawback for this particular application: at the optimal λ * , v λ * i is often discontinuous at x S . E.g., in Figure 8b , the upwind stencil containing the two λ * -optimal trajectories contains a point on either side of the discontinuity line of v λ * 1 (which is the shockline of u λ * ). As a result, the value of v λ * 1 (x S ) is updated by interpolating the discontinuous function v λ * 1 across the line of discontinuity. This effect happens when multiple trajectories are λ * -optimal. Each of these trajectories has the same expected cumulative observability J λ * = i λ * i J i , but different individual observability J i . This issue leads to large numerical error when using v λ i (x S ) to estimate the supergradient in Algorithm 4.2, causing poor convergence of the method. Instead, we use the following process to compute the individual costs: first we solve the weighted cost Eikonal equation (3.1) to obtain u λ for a fixed λ, then we trace the path y(t) using a gradient descent method on the value function u λ and numerically estimate the integrals:
, a λ (t)) dt, i = 1, . . . , r.
Additional numerical results.
We present two additional examples that include a higher number of observer plans. In Figure 9 , we show an example where the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium consists of a distribution over three strategies for both the evader and the observer. Figure 9 shows the value function u λ * at the optimal λ * . We observe that three shocklines of the value function u λ * meet at the source location x S , which implies that four trajectories are optimal starting from this location. However, the minimax theorem for infinite games assures that only 3 pure strategies are necessary to form a Nash equilibrium. Using Algorithm 4.3, we find an approximate Nash equilibrium which uses a mix of such three trajectories. In Figure 10 , we show a maze-like example where the observer may choose among six possible positions. Using Algorithm 4.3, we determine that at the approximate Nash equilibrium, only four positions are used with positive probability by O, and E uses four different trajectories which are displayed in Figure 10 . In order to test the performance of algorithm Algorithm 4.3, we consider three error metrics:
1. The optimization error in G(λ) arises from several effects: the discretization error of the Eikonal solver, the discretization error of the path tracing and path integral evaluation, and the early stopping of the supergradient iterations. To generate the "ground truth", we performed the same computation on a finer grid of size of n = 2001 × 2001 (i.e. we consider a grid with 16 times more unknowns) and run the supergradient iteration until we observe stagnation in the objective function value of the iterates. We approximate the relative error in our computations on a 501 × 501 grid as:
2. The Observer's regret estimates how much the observer could improve his payoff by unilaterally deviating from our approximate Nash equilibrium. (Recall that, if the approximate Nash equilibrium were exact, the observer would not be able to increase his payoff at all). We quantify this error using the normalized residual in (4.9), i.e.:
Observer's regret = R(ω) 2 |I|G(λ * ) .
3. The Evader's regret estimates how much the evader could improve his payoff by unilaterally deviating from our approximate Nash equilibrium. This corresponds to how far from λ * -optimal are the controls produced by Algorithm 4.3. Recall that the control function a 1 (·) is (up to numerical errors) λ * -optimal, whereas a k (·) for k ≥ 2 are (λ * + δλ)-optimal. We report the maximum relative error in λ * cumulative observability of the (λ * + δλ)optimal trajectories, that is:
These error metrics are reported in Table 1 along with timing metrics for each example presented in the paper. Table 1 Table of timing and error metrics. The error metrics are described in the main body of the text. 6. Extension to groups of evaders. We now consider an extension of the surveillance-evasion game to a game which involves a team of q evaders. Each evader E l chooses a trajectory leading him from his own source location x l S to a target location x l T , according to his own speed function f l (x). The pointwise observability function K λ is shared for all evaders and depends only on the strategy λ of the observer. This induces q different cumulative observability functions J l,λ (x l S , a l (·)) defined as in (2.1), and q different value functions u l,λ which are solutions of Eikonal equations with q different boundary conditions.
In this version of the game, we assume that a central organizer for evaders faces off against the observer. The goal of that central organizer is to minimize the weighted sum of evaders' cumulative expected observabilities. The weights {w l } l=q l=1 in the sum reflect the relative importance of each evader. We further assume that the central organizer and the observer agree on that relative importance, making this a two player zero-sum game with a payoff function defined by:
w l E θ l J l,λ (x l S , a l (·)) . (6.1)
Although we focus on a zero-sum two player game, we note that its Nash equilibrium λ * , {θ l } l=q l=1 must also be among Nash equilibria of a different (q + 1)-player game: the one, where each of the q evaders is selfishly minimizing their own cumulative observability J l,λ (x l S , a l (·)), while the observer still attempts to maximize the crowd-wide observability in (6.1). This property follows from two simple facts:
1. The Observer's payoff is the same in both versions of the game and thus cannot be improved unilaterally in a (q + 1) player game. 2. In the Nash equilibrium for the two-player game, the central organizer would only ask each evader to assign positive probabilities to their λ * -optimal trajectories. (Otherwise, the weighted sum in (6.1) could be improved). Thus, they would also be maximizing their individual payoffs.
In this new setting, Theorem 4.2 holds and the observer's half of the Nash equilibrium may be found by maximizing the concave function:
The function G q (λ) and its supergradients may be evaluated in a similar way to subsection 5.2, but require q solves of the Eikonal equation with different boundary conditions and speed functions, and the numerical evaluation of q × r path integrals. However, we note that if all evaders have the same speed function and share the same target location (or, alternatively, share the same source location), only a single Eikonal equation solve is in fact required. With minor modifications, Algorithm 4.3 may be also applied to solve this version of the problem. For each perturbation of λ * a set of q control functions is generated on line 8 of Algorithm 4.3, with one control function found for each evader. Although we obtain a new set of q control functions for each perturbation, some of the control functions for specific evaders may be essentially the same as those already obtained from previous perturbations. We address this in post-processing, by pruning the output of modified Algorithm 4.3 to identify distinct trajectories for each evader. We show numerical results for two test problems with q = 2 equally important evaders (i.e., w 1 = w 2 ) in each of them. An example presented in Figure 11 uses the same obstacle and the same r = 2 possible observer locations already used in Figure 6 . At the approximate Nash equilibrium found using Algorithm 4.3, the observer uses these two locations with probabilities λ * = (0.35, 0.65) and the central controller directs both evaders to use pure policies: deterministically choose pink and blue trajectories to their respective targets. Even though the first evader's starting position and destination are also the same as in Figure 6 , his (and the Observer's) optimal strategies are quite different here due to the second evader's participation.
In a maze-like example presented in Figure 11 , O can choose among six possible locations, but his optimal mixed strategy λ * uses only four of them. Algorithm 4.3 yields three sets of two near-λ * -optimal trajectories which form an approximate Nash equilibrium, but they only contain two distinct trajectories for each of the evaders. We report timing and error metrics for these two examples in Table 2 . 7. Conclusion. We introduced a surveillance-evasion game between an evader who seeks a trajectory minimizing his cumulative observability, and an observer choosing his position to maximize the evader's cumulative observability. In this game, neither player gets to observe the strategy of his opponent, and thus they are constrained to devise an adversarial plan which anticipates the actions of the enemy. We discussed two versions of the game; in the first one, a completely risk-averse evader attempts (a) (b) Fig. 11 . Computed approximate Nash equilibrium for a group of two evaders. The approximate Nash equilibrium pair of strategies is λ * for O, and a single λ * -optimal trajectory for each evader. to minimize his worst-case cumulative observability. We showed that this problem may be solved using previously developed methods for multiobjective path planning. However, the solution of this version of the game is prohibitively computationally expensive when the observer has a large number of observation plans at his disposal.
In the second version of the game, both players choose their strategy to either maximize or minimize the expected cumulative observability of the evader. We described optimal strategies of this strategic two player game using the concept of a Nash equilibrium. We then presented an algorithm combining ideas from continuous optimal control, the scalarization approach for multiobjective optimization, and convex optimization which allows us to quickly compute an approximate Nash equilibrium of this semi-infinite strategic game. Finally, we showed that this algorithm extends to solve a similar problem involving a group of multiple evaders controlled by a central planner. The algorithm presented displays at most linear scaling in the number of observation plans, but further speed up techniques would be desirable; the computational bottleneck (numerically solving the Eikonal equation) could be sped up with domain restriction methods [9] and factoring approaches [27] . Although this paper focused on isotropic problems, the anisotropic observer case could be treated in a similar fashion. (In practice, the pointwise observability might depend on the angle between the evader's direction of motion and the observer's line of sight.) This generalization will have to rely on fast numerical methods developed for anisotropic HJB PDEs; e.g., [1, 24, 31, 35] . Time-dependent observation plans (e.g., different patrol routes) could be also considered, which would lead to finite-horizon optimal control problems treated by numerical methods for time-dependent HJB equations; e.g., [15, 32] . We note that the computational cost of our algorithm increases quickly with the number of evaders considered. The case involving a large number of selfish evaders could be covered by considering the evolution of a time-dependent density of observers, and treating the problem using mean field games [6, 16] . Another possible extension would be to consider a group of observers choosing among a larger set of surveillance plans. In that situation, the set of pure strategies of the observers could increase exponentially, but we anticipate that the computational cost will grow much slower since the number of required Eikonal solves would not increase.
